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ON THE VALUE OF OPTIMAL STOPPING GAMES
By Erik Ekstro¨m and Stephane Villeneuve1
University of Manchester and University of Toulouse
We show, under weaker assumptions than in the previous litera-
ture, that a perpetual optimal stopping game always has a value. We
also show that there exists an optimal stopping time for the seller,
but not necessarily for the buyer. Moreover, conditions are provided
under which the existence of an optimal stopping time for the buyer
is guaranteed. The results are illustrated explicitly in two examples.
1. Introduction. In this paper we study a perpetual optimal stopping
game between two players, the “buyer” and the “seller.” Both players choose
a stopping time each, say τ and γ, and at the time τ ∧ γ := min{τ, γ}, the
seller pays the amount
Y1(τ)1{τ≤γ} + Y2(γ)1{τ>γ}(1.1)
to the buyer. Here Y1 and Y2 are two stochastic processes satisfying 0 ≤
Y1(t)≤ Y2(t) for all t almost surely. Clearly, the seller wants to minimize the
amount in (1.1) and the buyer wants to maximize this amount.
We consider discounted optimal stopping games defined in terms of two
continuous contract functions g1 and g2 satisfying 0 ≤ g1 ≤ g2 and a one-
dimensional diffusion process X(t). More precisely, given a constant dis-
counting rate β > 0, let
Y1(t) = e
−βtg1(X(t))
and
Y2(t) = e
−βtg2(X(t)).
Define the mapping Rx from the set of pairs (τ, γ) of stopping times to the
set [0,∞] by
Rx(τ, γ) := Exe
−βτ∧γ(g1(X(τ))1{τ≤γ} + g2(X(γ))1{τ>γ}).(1.2)
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Thus, Rx(τ, γ) is the expected discounted pay-off when the players use the
stopping times τ and γ as stopping strategies. Here the index x indicates that
the diffusion X is started at x at time 0. In (1.2), and in similar situations
below, we use the convention that
f(X(σ)) = 0 on {σ =∞},
where f is a function and σ is a random time. Next define the lower value
V and the upper value V as
V (x) := sup
τ
inf
γ
Rx(τ, γ)
and
V (x) := inf
γ
sup
τ
Rx(τ, γ),
respectively, where the supremums and the infimums are taken over random
times τ and γ that are stopping times. It is clear that
g1(x)≤ V (x)≤ V (x)≤ g2(x)
(the first and the last inequality follow from choosing τ = 0 or γ = 0 in the
definitions of V and V , resp.). If, in addition, the inequality
V (x)≥ V (x)
holds, that is, if V (x) = V (x), then the stochastic game is said to have a
value. In such cases, we denote the common value V (x) = V (x) by V (x). If
there exist two stopping times τ ′ and γ′ such that
Rx(τ, γ
′)≤Rx(τ
′, γ′)≤Rx(τ
′, γ)(1.3)
for all stopping times τ and γ, then the pair (τ ′, γ′) is referred to as a saddle
point for the stochastic game. It is clear that if there exists a saddle point
for the stochastic game, then the game also has a value.
It is well known (compare [2, 3, 10, 11, 13] and [15]) that under the
integrability condition
Ex
(
sup
0≤t<∞
e−βtg2(X(t))
)
<∞(1.4)
and the condition
lim
t→∞
e−βtg2(X(t)) = 0,
the stochastic game has a value V . Moreover, the two stopping times
τ∗ := inf{t :V (X(t)) = g1(X(t))}(1.5)
and
γ∗ := inf{t :V (X(t)) = g2(X(t))}(1.6)
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together form a saddle point for the game. Below we prove the existence
of a value under no integrability conditions at all. To do this, we use the
connection between excessive functions and concave functions; compare [6]
and [7]. More specifically, using concave functions, we produce a candidate
V ∗ for the value function, and then we prove that V ≥ V ∗ ≥ V . Thus, there
exists a value of the game, and this value is given by the candidate function
V ∗. One should note that we prove the existence of a value for perpetual op-
timal stopping games, that is, when there is no upper bound on the stopping
times τ and γ. It remains an open question if all optimal stopping games
with a finite time horizon have values.
One easily finds examples of stochastic differential games where the pair
(τ∗, γ∗) of stopping times defined by (1.5) and (1.6) is not a saddle point;
compare, for instance, the examples in Section 5.1. We prove below, however,
that γ∗ is always optimal for the seller. More precisely, we deal with the
following concepts closely related to the notion of a saddle point: a stopping
time τ ′ is optimal for the buyer if
Rx(τ
′, γ)≥ V (x)
for all stopping times γ, and a stopping time γ′ is optimal for the seller if
Rx(τ, γ
′)≤ V (x)
for all stopping times τ . Note that
τ ′ is optimal for the buyer and γ′ is optimal for the seller
⇐⇒ (τ ′, γ′) is a saddle point.
Also note that if τ ′ is optimal for the buyer, then
V (x)≤ inf
γ
Rx(τ
′, γ)≤ V (x)≤ V (x),
so the game has a value V (x) which is given by
V (x) = inf
γ
Rx(τ
′, γ).
Similarly, if γ′ is optimal for the seller, then the existence of a value V (x)
follows, and
V (x) = sup
τ
Rx(τ, γ
′).
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we specify the as-
sumptions on the diffusion X and we show that a stochastic game with
an infinite time horizon always has a value. This is done without the in-
tegrability condition (1.4); compare Theorem 2.5. We also show that γ∗ is
an optimal stopping time for the seller. The method used in the proof of
Theorem 2.5 also gives a characterization of the value function in terms of
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concave functions. As a straightforward consequence of this characterization,
the smooth-fit principle is deduced in Section 3. In Section 4 we provide ad-
ditional conditions under which τ∗ is optimal for the buyer, that is, (τ∗, γ∗)
is a saddle point. Finally, in Section 5 we explicitly determine the value of
two different game options, both of which may be regarded game versions of
the American call option. In these examples, the integrability condition (1.4)
is not fulfilled, so they are not covered by the theory in previous literature.
2. The value of a stochastic differential game. Let X be a stochastic
process with dynamics
dX(t) = µ(X(t))dt+ σ(X(t))dW (t),(2.1)
where µ and σ are given functions and W is a standard Brownian motion.
We assume that the two end-points of the state space of X are 0 and ∞,
and we assume for simplicity that both these end-points are natural. We also
assume that the functions µ(·) and σ(·) are continuous and that σ(x)> 0 for
all x ∈ (0,∞). It follows that the equation (2.1) has a (weak) solution which
is unique in the sense of probability law; see Chapter 5.5 in [12]. Moreover, X
is a regular diffusion, that is, for all x, y ∈ (0,∞), we have that y is reached
in finite time with a positive probability if the diffusion is started from x.
The second-order ordinary differential equation
Lu(x) :=
σ2(x)
2
uxx + µ(x)ux − βu= 0(2.2)
has two linearly independent solutions ψ,ϕ : (0,∞)→R which are uniquely
determined (up to multiplication with positive constants) by requiring one of
them to be positive and strictly increasing and the other one to be positive
and strictly decreasing; compare [5]. We let ψ be the increasing solution
and ϕ the decreasing solution. Since 0 and ∞ are assumed to be natural
boundaries of X , we have ψ(0+) = 0 = ϕ(∞). We also let F : (0,∞)→ (0,∞)
be the strictly increasing positive function defined by
F (x) :=
ψ(x)
ϕ(x)
.
Recall that a function u : (0,∞)→ R is said to be F -concave in an interval
J ⊂ (0,∞) if
u(x)≥ u(l)
F (r)− F (x)
F (r)−F (l)
+ u(r)
F (x)−F (l)
F (r)−F (l)
for all l, x, r ∈ J with l < x< r. Equivalently, the function u(F−1(·)) is con-
cave. F -convexity of a function is defined similarly.
Below we use the following two theorems relating concave and convex
functions to the value functions of optimal stopping problems. The first one
is Proposition 4.2 in [6]. The proof of the second one follows along the lines
of the proofs of Propositions 3.2 and 4.2 in [6] and is therefore omitted.
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Theorem 2.1. Let l, r be such that 0< l < r <∞, let g : [l, r]→ [0,∞)
be measurable and bounded, and let
U(x) := sup
τ≤τl,r
Exe
−βτg(X(τ)),
where
τl,r := inf{t :X(t) /∈ (l, r)}.
Then U is the smallest majorant of g such that U/ϕ is F -concave on [l, r].
Theorem 2.2. Let l, r be such that 0< l < r <∞, let g : [l, r]→ [0,∞)
be measurable and bounded, and let
U(x) := inf
γ≤γl,r
Exe
−βγg(X(γ)),
where
γl,r := inf{t :X(t) /∈ (l, r)}.
Then U is the largest minorant of g such that U/ϕ is F -convex on [l, r].
Remark. Note that it is important in Theorem 2.2 that the stopping
times γ are to be chosen among stopping times not exceeding the first exit
time γl,r of X(t) from the interval (l, r). If, for example, the choice γ =∞
would be included, then U would be identically 0.
Below we find our candidate value function V ∗ in the set
F = {f : (0,∞)→ [0,∞) :f is continuous, g1 ≤ f ≤ g2,
f/ϕ is F -concave in every interval in which f < g2}.
Note that F is nonempty since g2 ∈ F. We work below with the functions
Hi : (0,∞)→ [0,∞), i= 1,2, defined by
Hi(y) :=
gi(F
−1(y))
ϕ(F−1(y))
(2.3)
and the set
H = {h : (0,∞)→ [0,∞) :h is continuous, H1 ≤ h≤H2,
h is concave in every interval in which h <H2}.
Note that the functions in F are precisely the functions ϕ · (h ◦ F ) for some
function h ∈H.
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Lemma 2.3. Let {hn}
∞
n=1 be a sequence of functions in H. Then the
function h defined by
h(y) := inf
n
hn(y)
is an element of H.
Proof. First we claim that the minimum of two functions in H is again
in H. To see this, assume that h1, h2 ∈H and let h := h1 ∧ h2. Clearly, h is
continuous and satisfies H1 ≤ h≤H2. Let y ∈ (0,∞) satisfy h(y) <H2(y).
Consider the two separate cases h1(y) 6= h2(y) and h1(y) = h2(y)<H(y). In
the first case, there exists an open interval containing y such that h= h1 or
h= h2 in this interval and, thus, h is concave in this interval. For the second
case, there exists an open interval containing y such that both h1 and h2
are concave. Since the minimum of two concave functions is concave, h is
also concave in this interval. It follows that h is concave in every interval in
which h <H2, which shows that h ∈H.
Thus, we may, without loss of generality, assume that hn+1 ≤ hn for all
n. Let h(y) := infn hn(y) and define
U := {y :h(y)<H2(y)}.
Note that h, being the infimum of continuous functions, is upper semi-
continuous, so U is open. Choose two points l, r ∈U with l < r and [l, r]⊂ U .
The interval [l, r] is compact, and it is covered by the increasing family
{Un}
∞
n=1 of open sets
Un := {y :hn(y)<H2(y)}.
Hence, there exists an integer N such that [l, r]⊂ Un for all n≥N . For such
n, hn is concave on [l, r], and therefore, also h is concave on this interval.
Consequently, h is concave on each interval contained in U , and thus also
continuous at all points in U .
To show that h ∈H, it remains to check that h is continuous also at all
boundary points of U . Let l ∈ U \U , where U is the closure of U in (0,∞),
and let {lk}
∞
k=1 be a sequence of points in U converging to l from the right
(left-continuity is dealt with similarly). Because h is upper semi-continuous,
it is enough to prove that h(l)≤ h(l+).
Assume first that (l, l+ ε0)⊂ U for some ε0 > 0. We assume, to reach a
contradiction, that there exists ε > 0 such that h(l)− ε > h(l+). Then there
exists δ > 0 such that the straight line L connecting the points (l, h(l)− ε)
and (l+δ,h(l+δ)) satisfies h(y)<L(y)<H2(y) for y ∈ (l, l+δ). Now, choose
a y ∈ (l, l + δ). Then there exists an n such that hn(y) < L(y). For this n,
hn(l) ≤ L(l) since hn is concave and hn(l + δ) ≥ L(l + δ). Consequently,
h(l)≤ hn(l)≤L(l) = h(l)− ε, which is the required contradiction.
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On the other hand, if there does not exist an ε0 > 0 such that h <H2 in
(l, l+ ε0), then the previous case can be applied to deduce right-continuity
of h at l. Indeed, for ε > 0, choose δ > 0 such that
|H2(y)−H2(l)| ≤ ε for y ∈ [l, l+ δ].
Without loss of generality, we may assume that H2 = h at l+ δ (since points
with H2 = h exist arbitrarily close to l). Now, for a point lk ∈ (l, l+ δ), there
exists a maximal (possibly empty) surrounding interval in which h < H2.
We know from above that h is concave in the closure of this interval, and
thus, h≥H2(l)− ε in the interval. In particular, h(lk)≥H2(l)− ε. Since we
also have h(lk)≤H2(lk)≤H2(l) + ε, and since ε is arbitrary, it follows that
h(lk)→ H2(l) = h(l) as k→∞. Hence, h is continuous at l, and thus, we
have shown that h ∈H. 
Lemma 2.4. There exists a smallest element V ∗ ∈ F. Moreover, the
function V ∗/ϕ is F -convex in every interval in which V ∗ > g1.
Proof. Since the functions in F are precisely the functions ϕ(x)h(F (x))
for some function h ∈ H, it suffices to show that there exists a smallest
element in H and that this smallest element is convex in every interval of
strict majorization of H1. In order to do this, define
W (y) := inf
h∈H
h(y).
Being the infimum of continuous functions,W is itself upper semi-continuous.
Let {yk}
∞
k=1 be a dense sequence of points in (0,∞), and for each k, let
{hkn}
∞
n=1 ⊆H
be a sequence of functions in H such that infn h
k
n(yk) =W (yk). Next, define
the function W ∗ by
W ∗(y) = inf
k
inf
n
hkn(y).
According to Lemma 2.3,W ∗ ∈H. Moreover, the nonnegative functionW ∗−
W is lower semi-continuous and vanishes on a dense subset of (0,∞). It
follows that W ≡W ∗, so W ∈H, which finishes the first part of the proof.
To show the convexity on each interval in which W >H1, let I be such
an interval and fix y′ ∈ I . By continuity of H1, H2 and W , we can find δ > 0
so that
inf
y∈Iδ
W (y)≥ sup
y∈Iδ
H1(y),
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where Iδ := [y′− δ, y′+ δ]. Now assume, to reach a contradiction, that there
exist points y1, y2 ∈ I
δ with y1 < y
′ < y2 and
W (y′)>W (y1)
y2 − y
′
y2 − y1
+W (y2)
y′ − y1
y2 − y1
=: L(y′).(2.4)
Since W is continuous, W (y)>L(y) for y in an open set containing y′. Let
us introduce
y′1 = sup{y ∈ [y1, y
′] ,W (y) =L(y)}
and
y′2 = inf{y ∈ [y
′, y2] ,W (y) =L(y)}.
It is now straightforward to check that the function
h(y) :=
{
L(y), if y ∈ [y′1, y
′
2],
W (y), if y /∈ (y′1, y
′
2),
satisfies h ∈H. However, h <W in y ∈ (y′1, y
′
2) contradicts the minimality of
W , and thus, (2.4) is not true. This means that W is convex at the point
y′, so, by continuity, W is convex on I , which finishes the second part of the
proof. 
Theorem 2.5. For any starting point x > 0, the perpetual optimal stop-
ping game has a value V (x) := V (x) = V (x). Moreover, V ≡ V ∗, where V ∗
is the function appearing in Lemma 2.4, and the stopping time
γ∗ := inf{t :V (X(t)) = g2(X(t))}
is an optimal stopping time for the seller.
Proof. Let V ∗ be the function in Lemma 2.4, and choose x ∈ (0,∞).
To prove the existence of a value, we will show that
V (x)≤ V ∗(x)≤ V (x).(2.5)
To prove the first inequality, assume that the maximal interval containing x
in which V ∗ < g2 is (l, r) for some points l < r [if V
∗(x) = g2(x), then the first
inequality obviously holds since V ≤ g2]. Assume also, for the moment, that
0 < l and r <∞. It follows that V ∗(l) = g2(l) and V
∗(r) = g2(r). Inserting
γ = γl,r in the definition of V yields
V (x)≤ sup
τ
Exe
−βτ∧γl,r (g1(X(τ))1{τ≤γl,r} + g2(X(γl,r))1{τ>γl,r})
≤ sup
τ≤γl,r
Exe
−βτg∗(X(τ))(2.6)
=: U∗(x),
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where the function g∗ is defined by
g∗(x) =
{
g1(x), if x ∈ (l, r),
g2(x), if x ∈ {l, r}.
(2.7)
Note that V ∗ majorizes g∗ and that V ∗/ϕ is F -concave on (l, r). Accord-
ing to Theorem 2.1, U∗ is the smallest such function, so U∗(x) ≤ V ∗(x).
Consequently,
V (x)≤ V ∗(x).(2.8)
Now, if we instead have 0 = l and/or r =∞, then the above reasoning again
applies if we plug in γr := inf{t :X(t) ≥ r}, γl := inf{t :X(t) ≤ l} or γ =∞
in the definition of V and use Propositions 5.3 or 5.11 in [6] instead of
Theorem 2.1.
To show the second inequality in (2.5), we argue similarly. Choose an x
and let (l, r) be a maximal interval containing x in which V ∗ > g1. As above,
let us first assume that
0< l and r <∞.(2.9)
Inserting τ = τl,r in the definition of V gives
V (x)≥ inf
γ
Exe
−βτl,r∧γ(g1(X(τl,r))1{τl,r≤γ} + g2(X(γ))1{τl,r>γ})
= inf
γ≤τl,r
Exe
−βγg∗(X(γ)),
where the function g∗ is given by
g∗(x) =
{
g2(x), if x ∈ (l, r),
g1(x), if x ∈ {l, r}.
Thus, since V ∗/ϕ is F -convex in (l, r) (see Lemma 2.4), it follows from
Theorem 2.2 that V (x)≥ V ∗(x). Thus, we have shown the second inequality
in (2.5) under the assumption (2.9).
Now, if (2.9) is not the case, then the second inequality in (2.5) requires
some slightly more involved analysis. For example, assume that
0< l and r =∞.(2.10)
To prove V (x)≥ V ∗(x), in this case we do not plug in τl := inf{t :X(t)≤ l} in
the definition of V , but we rather use the stopping times τl,N = inf{t :X(t) /∈
(l,N)} for different N ≥ l (compare the remark following the current proof ).
Thus, for any N ≥ x, choosing τ = τl,N in the definition of V gives
V (x)≥ inf
γ
Rx(τl,N , γ) = inf
γ≤τl,N
Exe
−βγg∗(X(γ)) =: VN (x),(2.11)
where
g∗(x) =
{
g2(x), if x ∈ (l,N),
g1(x), if x= {l,N}.
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From Theorem 2.2, it follows that VN is majorized by g∗, that VN/ϕ is F -
convex on [l,N ], and that VN is the largest function with these properties.
It is clear from (2.8) and (2.11) that
sup
N≥x
VN (x)≤ V (x)≤ V
∗(x).
We show below that we in fact have
sup
N≥x
VN (x) = V
∗(x).(2.12)
Note that (2.12) implies that
V (x) = V ∗(x)
and therefore also the existence of a value. To prove (2.12), we will work in
the coordinates y defined by y = F (x).
Let Hi, i= 1,2, be defined by Hi =
gi
ϕ ◦ F
−1. Then
WN ′ :=
VN
ϕ
◦ F−1 : [l′,N ′]→R
is the largest convex function majorized by the function
H(y) :=
{
H2(y), if y ∈ (l
′,N ′),
H1(y), if y ∈ {l
′,N ′},
(2.13)
where l′ := F (l) andN ′ := F (N). LetW := V
∗
ϕ ◦F
−1 (thus,W is the function
defined in the proof of Lemma 2.4). The conditions 0< l and r=∞ translate
to l′ > 0, W (l′) =H1(l
′) and W (y) >H1(y) for all y > l
′. Next, for y > l′,
define
Wˆ (y) := sup
N ′≥y
WN ′(y).
We need to show that Wˆ ≥W . To do this, note that since W >H1 in the
interval [l′,∞), we know from Lemma 2.4 that W is convex in this interval.
Choose y0 > l
′, let
k := lim
εց0
W (y0 + ε)−W (y0)
ε
be the right derivative of W at y0, and let L(y) = k(y − y0) +W (y0) be the
steepest tangential of W at y0. Note that L(y) ≤W (y) ≤ H2(y). Now we
consider two cases.
First, assuming the existence of a pointN ′ > y0 such that L(N
′) =H1(N
′),
the function
h(y) =
{
W (y), if y ∈ [l′, y0],
L(y), if y ∈ [y0,N
′],
ON THE VALUE OF OPTIMAL STOPPING GAMES 11
is convex and dominated by H2 in (l
′,N ′) and by H1 at the points l
′ and N ′.
Therefore, h≤WN ′ by Theorem 2.2, so
Wˆ (y0)≥W (y0).
Second, assume that there is no point N ′ > y0 such that L(N
′) =H1(N
′).
Note that the function
h(y) =
{
W (y), if y ∈ (0, y0],
L(y), if y ∈ [y0,∞),
is an element of the set H. Since W is the smallest function in this set, it
follows that we must have W (y) = L(y) for all y ≥ y0. Moreover, for each
ε > 0, there exists a point of intersection (to the right of y0) between the
line Lε(y) := (k− ε)(y− y0)+W (y0) and H1 (otherwise a function in H can
be constructed which is strictly smaller than W in some interval). Now, let
z < W (y0), and consider the straight lines through (y0, z) that are below
W in the interval [l′, y0]. Let k
′ be the slope of the largest such straight
line (i.e., k′ is the smallest possible slope), denote this line by L′, and let
y′ ∈ [l′, y0) be the largest value for which W = L
′. Since W is convex in
[l′,∞), we have that k′ < k, and thus, the straight line through (y0,W (y0))
with slope k′ and the function H1 have a point (N
′,H1(N
′)) of intersection
for some N ′ > y0. Let L
′′ be the straight line between the points (y0, z) and
(N ′,H1(N
′)). Then the function which equals W in [l′, y′], L′ in [y′, y0] and
L′′ in [y0,N
′] is convex and smaller than the function H defined as in (2.13).
Consequently, the corresponding function WN ′ satisfies WN ′(y0)≥ z. Since
z <W (y0) is arbitrary, it follows that Wˆ (y0)≥W (y0).
Thus, we have shown under the assumption (2.10) that (2.12) holds, im-
plying the second inequality in (2.5). By symmetry, the above argument also
applies in the case when l= 0 and r <∞. The remaining case, that is, when
l= 0 and r =∞, can be handled with similar methods (we omit the details).
Finally, since we have shown that the first inequality in (2.6) actually is
an equality, it follows that γ∗ is optimal for the seller. 
Remark. Note that the function W in the proof of Lemma 2.4 is the
smallest function in the set
H = {h : (0,∞)→ [0,∞) :h is continuous, H1 ≤ h≤H2,
h is concave in every interval in which h <H2},
whereas, in general, it is not the largest function in the set
{h : (0,∞)→ [0,∞) :h is continuous, H1 ≤ h≤H2,
h is convex in every interval in which h >H1}
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(although W is a member also of this set). This asymmetry of the function
W (and the corresponding one for the function V ∗) may be regarded as the
underlying reason for the asymmetry in the proof of the first and the second
inequality in (2.5).
Remark. Let us introduce the perpetual American option value V∞
associated with the payoff g1, that is,
V∞(x) := sup
τ
Exe
−βτg1(X(τ)).(2.14)
Obviously, V ≤ V∞. An immediate consequence of Theorem 2.5 is that the
implication
V∞(x0)≥ g2(x0) for some x0 ∈ (0,∞) =⇒ {x :V (x) = g2(x)} 6= ∅
holds. Indeed, assume that V∞(x0) ≥ g2(x0) for some x0 and that V (x) <
g2(x) for all x ∈ (0,∞). Then γ
∗ =∞, so V ≡ V∞ by Theorem 2.5. It follows
that V (x0)≥ g2(x0), which is a contradiction.
3. The smooth-fit principle. In the following proposition, let H1 and H2
be the functions defined in (2.3) and let W be the smallest element in the
set H. Moreover, let d
−
dy and
d+
dy denote the left and the right differential
operators, respectively, that is,
d−
dy
h(y0) := lim
εց0
h(y0)− h(y0 − ε)
−ε
and
d+
dy
h(y0) := lim
εց0
h(y0 + ε)− h(y0)
ε
.
Proposition 3.1. Assume that y1 ∈ (0,∞) is such that H1(y1) =W (y1)<
H2(y1). Also assume that the left and right derivatives
d−
dyH1 and
d+
dyH1 exist
at y1. Then
d−
dy
H1(y1)≥
d−
dy
W (y1)≥
d+
dy
W (y1)≥
d+
dy
H1(y1).(3.1)
Similarly, if y2 ∈ (0,∞) is such that H2(y2) =W (y2) and
d−
dyH2 and
d+
dyH2
exist at y2, then
d−
dy
H1(y2)≤
d−
dy
W (y2)≤
d+
dy
W (y2)≤
d+
dy
H1(y2).(3.2)
Proof. SinceW (y1) =H1(y1), the first and the third inequality in (3.1)
follow from V ≥H1. Since W (y1)<H2(y1), we know that W is concave in
a neighborhood of y1. From this, the second inequality follows.
The inequalities in (3.2) follow similarly. 
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Remark. Note that for the middle inequalities in (3.1) and (3.2) to
hold, it is essential that W (y1)<H2(y1) and H1(y2)<W (y2), respectively.
Indeed, (3.1) is, for example, not true at the point y1 =K1 if
H1(y) = (y ∧K3 −K2)
+
and
H2(y) = (y −K1)
+
for some constants K3 >K2 >K1 > 0.
After a change of coordinates, Proposition 3.1 translates to the following
smooth-fit principle. Note that, in line with the above results, no integrabil-
ity conditions are assumed.
Corollary 3.2 (Smooth-fit principle). Let x0 ∈ (0,∞) and assume that
V (x0) = gi(x0), where either i= 1 or i= 2. Assume also that g1(x0)< g2(x0)
and that gi is differentiable at x0. Then also V is differentiable at x0 and
d
dx
V (x0) =
d
dx
gi(x0).
4. Existence of a saddle point. According to Theorem 2.5, γ∗ is an op-
timal stopping time for the seller. It turns out, however, that
τ∗ := inf{t :V (X(t)) = g1(X(t))}
in general need not be optimal for the buyer; compare the examples in
Section 5. A necessary condition for (τ∗, γ∗) to be a saddle point is that
P(τ∗ <∞)> 0,
or, equivalently, that the set
E1 := {x ∈ (0,∞) :V (x) = g1(x)}
is nonempty. Indeed, Rx(∞,∞) = 0, and thus, τ
∗ =∞ cannot be optimal
for the buyer (at least not if g1 6≡ 0). Below we give an analytical criterion
in terms of the differential operator
L :=
σ2
2
∂2
∂x2
+ µ
∂
∂x
− β,
ensuring that the set E1 is empty. To this end, we restrict the class of payoff
functions by requiring some additional regularity conditions.
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Hypothesis 4.1. Let D = {a1, . . . , an}, where n ∈N and ai are positive
real numbers with a1 < a2 < · · ·< an. Suppose that g1 is a continuous func-
tion on (0,∞) such that g′1 and g
′′
1 exist and are continuous on (0,∞) \D
and that the limits
g′1(ai±) := limx→ai±
g′1(x), g
′′
1 (ai±) := limx→ai±
g′′1 (x)
exist and are finite.
Proposition 4.2. Assume that the function g1 satisfies Hypothesis 4.1
and that g2 > g1 on some open interval I ⊂ (0,∞). If Lg1 is a nonzero
nonnegative measure on I , then V (x)> g1(x) for every x ∈ I . Thus, if I =
(0,∞), then the set E1 is empty, and consequently, τ
∗ is not optimal for the
buyer (provided g1 6≡ 0).
Similarly, if Lg2 is a nonzero nonpositive measure on I , then V (x) <
g2(x) for all x ∈ I .
Remark. That Lg1 is a nonnegative measure on I means that Lg1(x)≥
0 for all x ∈ I \D and g′1(a−) ≤ g
′
1(a+) for all a ∈ I ∩D. That Lg1 is a
nonzero nonnegative measure on I means that at least one of these inequal-
ities is strict.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Fix x ∈ I and choose l, r ∈ I with l < x<
r so that Lg1 is a nonzero nonnegative measure on (l, r)⊂ I . According to
Theorem 2.5, V (x) = supτ Rx(τ, γ
∗) and thus
V (x)≥Rx(τl,r, γ
∗)≥ Ex(e
−β(τl,r∧γ
∗)g1(X(τl,r ∧ γ
∗))).(4.1)
Note that if Px(γ
∗ < τl,r)> 0, then the second inequality in (4.1) is strict. Be-
cause g1 satisfies Hypothesis 4.1, the Itoˆ–Tanaka formula (see Theorem 3.7.1,
page 218 in [12]) gives
Ex(e
−β(τl,r∧γ
∗)g1(X(τl,r ∧ γ
∗)))
= g1(x) + Ex
(∫ τl,r∧γ∗
0
e−βsLg1(X(s))ds
)
+
∑
ai∈(l,r)
(g′1(ai+)− g
′
1(ai−))Ex
(∫ τl,r∧γ∗
0
e−βs dLi(s)
)
,
where Li is the local time of X at ai. Now, since Lg1 is nonnegative on (l, r),
we find that
Ex(e
−β(τl,r∧γ
∗)g1(X(τl,r ∧ γ
∗)))≥ g1(x).
Moreover, if γ∗ ≥ τl,r a.s., then this inequality is strict. Indeed, since Lg1 is
a nonzero nonnegative measure on (l, r), we have that either Lg1(y)> 0 for
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some y ∈ (l, r), where g1 is differentiable (implying that the middle term is
strictly positive), or g′1(ai+)> g
′
1(ai−) for some ai ∈ (l, r) (implying that the
last term is strictly positive). Thus, in view of (4.1), we have V (x)> g1(x),
which finishes the proof of the first part of the proposition.
As for the second claim, by Proposition 4.4 in [6] [note that it is also valid
for contracts, functions of the type (2.7)], we may replace (4.1) with
V (x)≤ sup
τ
Rx(τ, γl,r) =Rx(τˆ , γl,r)
for some stopping time τˆ . The proof now follows as above. 
Below we provide conditions under which τ∗ is optimal for the buyer. Fol-
lowing [1] and [6], the conditions are expressed in terms of the two quantities
l0 := limsup
x→0
g1(x)
ϕ(x)
and l∞ := limsup
x→∞
g1(x)
ψ(x)
.
Proposition 4.3. Assume that both l0 and l∞ are finite. Also assume
that the nonnegative local martingales e−βtϕ(X(t)) and e−βtψ(X(t)) satisfy
Ex
(
sup
0≤s≤t
e−βsϕ(X(s))
)
<∞ and Ex
(
sup
0≤s≤t
e−βsψ(X(s))
)
<∞(4.2)
for all times t. Then the process e−βt∧τ
∗
V (X(t ∧ τ∗)) is a sub-martingale.
Proof. We know from Theorem 2.5 that V/ϕ is F -convex in all inter-
vals where V > g1. Arguing as in the proof of Proposition 5.1 in [6], it can
therefore be shown that Z(t) := e−βt∧τ
∗
V (X(t ∧ τ∗)) is a sub-martingale,
provided
Ex
(
sup
0≤s≤t
Z(s)
)
<∞
(this is needed for the use of Fatou’s lemma). From the results in [6] (compare
Propositions 5.4 and 5.12 of that paper) we know that
limsup
x→0
V (x)
ϕ(x)
= l0 and limsup
x→∞
V (x)
ψ(x)
= l∞.
Thus, there exist constants C and D with
V (x)≤Cϕ(x) +Dψ(x)
for all x ∈ (0,∞). From the assumption (4.2), it therefore follows that
sup0≤s≤tZ(s) is integrable, which completes the proof. 
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Remark. Without the assumption (4.2), Proposition 4.3 would not be
true. Also note that to show that the process e−βt∧γ
∗
V (X(t ∧ γ∗)) is a
super-martingale, neither the finiteness of l0 and l∞ nor the condition (4.2)
is needed.
The following two results may be viewed as the game versions of Propo-
sition 5.13 and 5.14 in [6].
Theorem 4.4. Assume ( 4.2) and that
l0 = l∞ = 0.(4.3)
Then (τ∗, γ∗) is a saddle point.
Proof. From Proposition 4.3, it follows that
V (x)≤ Ex(e
−β(t∧τ∗∧γ)V (X(t∧ τ∗ ∧ γ)))
≤ Ex(e
−βτ∗V (X(τ∗))1{τ∗≤t∧γ} + e
−βγV (X(γ))1{γ<t∧τ∗})
+ Ex(e
−βtV (X(t))1{t≤τ∗∧γ})
for any stopping time γ. We first prove that the last term converges to zero
when t tends to +∞. To do this, recall that the assumption (4.3) implies
lim
x→0
V (x)
ϕ(x)
= lim
x→∞
V (x)
ψ(x)
= 0.
Thus, given a constant δ > 0, there exists a constant M such that V (x)≤
δϕ(x)+δψ(x)+M for all x. Using the fact that e−βtϕ(X(t)) and e−βtψ(X(t))
are nonnegative local martingales, and hence supermartingales, we find
Ex(e
−βtV (X(t))1{t≤τ∗∧γ})≤Me
−βt + δExe
−βtϕ(X(t)) + δExe
−βtψ(X(t))
≤Me−βt + δϕ(x) + δψ(x).
Since δ can be chosen arbitrarily, we conclude the first step. Next, the mono-
tone convergence theorem yields
V (x)≤ lim
t→∞
Ex(e
−βτ∗V (X(τ∗))1{τ∗≤t∧γ} + e
−βγV (X(γ))1{γ<t∧τ∗})
≤ lim
t→∞
Ex(e
−βτ∗g1(X(τ
∗))1{τ∗≤t∧γ} + e
−βγg2(X(γ))1{γ<t∧τ∗})
= Ex(e
−βτ∗g1(X(τ
∗))1{τ∗≤γ} + e
−βγg2(X(γ))1{γ<τ∗})
=Rx(τ
∗, γ),
that is, τ∗ is optimal for the buyer. This completes the proof. 
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Theorem 4.5. Assume (4.2) and that l0 and l∞ are both finite. Then,
the pair (τ∗, γ∗) is a saddle point for arbitrary starting point if and only if

there is no l > 0 such that
g1(x)< V (x) for all x≤ l
if l0 > 0

 and


there is no r > 0 such that
g1(x)< V (x) for all x≥ r
if l∞ > 0

 .
Proof. If l0 = l∞ = 0, then the result follows from Theorem 4.4. There-
fore, we assume that l∞ > 0 (the case l0 > 0 can be treated similarly).
To prove the sufficiency of the condition, fix a starting point x ∈ (0,∞).
If V (x) = g1(x), then τ
∗ = 0 is clearly optimal for the buyer, and thus, we
are finished. If V (x) > g1(x), let I := (a, b) ⊂ (0,∞) be a maximal interval
containing x such that V > g1 in I . Note that
τ∗ = inf{t :X(t) /∈ I},
and that b <∞ by assumption. Moreover, given δ > 0, there exists a constant
M such that V ≤M + δϕ in I . Indeed, if a > 0, then V is bounded in I , and
if a= 0, then l0 = 0 by assumption. Thus, proceeding analogously as in the
proof of Theorem 4.4, we obtain
V (x)≤ lim
t→∞
Ex(e
−β(t∧τ∗∧γ)V (X(t∧ τ∗ ∧ γ)))
≤ lim
t→∞
Ex(e
−βτ∗V (X(τ∗))1{τ∗≤t∧γ} + e
−βγV (X(γ))1{γ<t∧τ∗})
+ δϕ(x) + lim
t→∞
Me−βt
≤Rx(τ
∗, γ) + δϕ(x)
for a stopping time γ. Since δ is arbitrary, this shows that τ∗ is optimal for
the buyer.
Conversely, assume that (τ∗, γ∗) is a saddle point for each starting point x
and that V (x)> g1(x) for x≥ r. Then, for x≥ r, the stopping time τ
∗ ≥ τr
a.s. The definition of a saddle point and the optional sampling theorem
applied to the nonnegative supermartingale e−βtV∞(Xt), where V∞ is the
perpetual American option value as defined in (2.14), give
V (x) =Rx(τ
∗, γ∗)
≤Rx(τ
∗,∞) = Ex(e
−βτ∗g1(X(τ
∗)))
≤ Ex(e
−βτ∗V∞(X(τ
∗)))
≤ Ex(e
−βτrV∞(X(τr)))
=
ϕ(x)
ϕ(r)
V∞(r),
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where we in the last equation used (2.6) in [6]. Proposition 5.4 in [6] then
implies that
l∞ = limsup
x→∞
V (x)
ψ(x)
≤
V∞(r)
ϕ(r)
lim
x→∞
ϕ(x)
ψ(x)
= 0,
which contradicts l∞ > 0. 
5. Two examples of game options. In this section we study two exam-
ples motivated by applications in finance. In both examples we assume that
µ(x) = βx, where β is the discounting rate. Thus, the diffusion X solves
dX(t) = βX(t)dt+ σ(X(t))dW (t),
and V may be interpreted as the arbitrage free price of a game option written
on a nondividend paying stock; compare [14]. Note that the functions ψ and
ϕ are given (up to multiplication with a positive constant) by
ψ(x) = x
and
ϕ(x) = x
∫ ∞
x
1
u2
exp
{
−
∫ u
1
2βz
σ2(z)
dz
}
du.(5.1)
5.1. The game version of a call option. In this subsection we study the
game version of a call option, that is,
g1(x) = (x−K)
+ and g2(x) = (x−K)
+ + ε
for some positive constants K and ε. If ε ≥ K, then one can show that
the game option reduces to an ordinary perpetual American call option.
Therefore, we consider the case with ε <K.
The functions Hi := (
gi
ϕ ) ◦ F
−1, i= 1,2, are given by
H1(y) =
(
y −
K
ϕ(F−1(y))
)+
and
H2(y) =
(
y−
K
ϕ(F−1(y))
)+
+
ε
ϕ(F−1(y))
.
First we claim that the function
w(y) :=
1
ϕ(F−1(y))
is concave. To see this, note that by letting y = F (x), we find that
w(y) =
1
ϕ(F−1(y))
=
1
ϕ(x)
=
F (x)
x
=
y
F−1(y)
,
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where we have used F (x) = x/ϕ(x). Straightforward calculations yield that
w′′(y)−
ϕ′′(x)
ϕ3(x)(F ′(x))2
.
Using (5.1), one can check that ϕ′′(x) ≥ 0, so it follows that w is concave.
Since w is concave, H1 is 0 on (0, F (K)) and convex in (F (K),∞), and H2
is concave in (0, F (K)) and convex in (F (K),∞). This, together with the
easily checked facts
lim
y→∞
H1(y)
y
= 1, H ′2(y)< 1
and
H ′2(F (K)+) =
ε
K
+
(K − ε)F (K)
K2F ′(K)
>
ε
K
=
H2(F (K))
F (K)
,
implies that the smallest function W in H is given by
W (y) =
{ εy
K
, if y ∈ (0, F (K)],
H2(y), if y ∈ (F (K),∞).
In the usual coordinates this means that the value V of the game version of
a call option written on a no-dividend paying stock is
V (x) =
{ εx
K
, if x ∈ (0,K],
x−K + ε, if x ∈ (K,∞).
According to Theorem 2.5, an optimal stopping time for the seller is given
by
γ∗ := inf{t :X(t)≥K}.
Also note that the corresponding stopping time τ∗ =∞ is not optimal for
the buyer.
5.2. An example in which convexity is lost. In this subsection we consider
another possible generalization of the American call option. More precisely,
let
g1(x) = (x−K)
+ and g2(x) =C(x−K)
+
for some constant C > 1. Moreover, assume for simplicity that the diffusion
X is a geometric Brownian motion, that is, that
dX(t) = βX(t)dt+ σX(t)dW (t)
for some constant σ > 0. Then the functions ψ and ϕ are given by
ψ(x) = x and ϕ(x) = x−2β/σ
2
,
20 E. EKSTRO¨M AND S. VILLENEUVE
and the functions Hi, i= 1,2, are given by
H1(y) = (y −Ky
2β/(2β+σ2))+ and H2(y) =C(y −Ky
2β/(2β+σ2))+.
We need to consider two different cases.
5.2.1. Case 1. First assume that C ≥ 1 + 2β/σ2. Then it is straightfor-
ward to check that W (y) = (y −K(2β+σ
2)/σ2)+, that is, the value V of the
option is given by
V (x) = ϕ(x)W (F (x)) = (x−K(2β+σ
2)/σ2x−2β/σ
2
)+.
Moreover, Theorem 2.5 tells us that γ∗ := inf{t :X(t) ≤ K} is an optimal
stopping time for the seller.
5.2.2. Case 2. Now assume that 1<C < 1+2β/σ2. Then one can check
that
W (y) =
{
H2(y), if y ∈ (0, y
′),
H2(y
′) + y− y′, if y ∈ [y′,∞),
where y′ is given by
y′ =
(
2βCK
(2β + σ2)(C − 1)
)(2β+σ2)/σ2
.
It follows that
V (x) =


C(x−K)+, if x∈ (0, x′),
x−
CKσ2
2β + σ2
(
x′
x
)2β/σ2
, if x∈ [x′,∞),
where
x′ =
2βCK
(2β + σ2)(C − 1)
.
According to Theorem 2.5, γ∗ := inf{t :X(t)≤ x′} is optimal for the seller.
As in the previous example, however, τ∗ = inf{t :X(t)≤K} is not optimal
for the buyer.
Remark. The above example shows, perhaps surprisingly, that game
options are not convexity preserving. More precisely, although both con-
tract functions g1 and g2 are convex, the value of the game option need not
necessarily be convex. This is in contrast to options of European and Amer-
ican style, both of which are known to be convexity preserving; compare, for
example, [4] or [9] and the references therein.
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Remark. The method to determine the value of an optimal stopping
game used in this section is also used in [8]. In that paper the construction of
the value using concave functions is shown to be valid under the assumption
of the existence of a value and a saddle point of the form (τ∗, γ∗). In the
present paper we start with the construction of a natural candidate for the
value function (without knowing a priori that such a value function exists),
and then we show that this function indeed has to be the value of the game.
This allows us to weaken the assumptions under which a game is known to
have a value. Also note that the integrability condition (1.4) is satisfied in
neither of the two examples provided in this section.
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